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Abstract. I criticize the following three arguments for moral objectivism. 1. Since we 
assess moral statements, we can arrive at some moral truths (Thomson, 2006). 2. 
One culture can be closer to truths than another in moral matters because the for-
mer can be closer to truths than the latter in scientific matters (Pojman, 2008). 3. A 
moral judgment is shown to be true when it is backed up by reason (Rachels and 
Rachels, 2010). Finally, I construct a dilemma against the view that there are moral 
truths and we can move toward them.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, the Korean government banned corporal punishment in 
schools. As a result, teachers can no longer use rods against unruly stu-
dents in Korean schools. This new policy raised a heated debate between 
liberals and conservatives in Korea. Liberals claim that corporal punish-
ment is not right under any circumstances, whereas conservatives con-
tend that it is right under certain circumstances. No agreement between 
the two parties is forthcoming. Such controversial moral disputes are 
what Harman calls “intractable moral disagreements” (2006: 8). Intracta-
ble moral disagreements raise interesting meta-ethical questions: Why is 
it difficult to reach an agreement on the moral issue? Is it true or false 
that corporal punishment is wrong? Are there moral truths that trans-
cend diverse cultures? What are we doing when we say that corporal 
punishment is wrong? Are we describing corporal punishment? Or are 
we merely expressing our negative emotion toward it? Does the property 
of being right or wrong exist in the world in the way that descriptive 
properties like mass, shape, size, and motion do? If moral properties and 
facts inhabit the physical universe, how can we discover them? Different 
answers to these questions will be given by a moral objectivist, a cultural 
relativist, and an emotivist. Their answers are intricately related to one 
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another, so criticizing moral objectivism, an aim of this paper, inevitably 
involves the discussion of cultural relativism and emotivism.  
Cultural relativism holds that cultural approval is what makes an action 
moral, and cultural disapproval is what makes an action immoral. On this 
account, an action can be morally evaluated only in reference to a culture. 
Thus, corporal punishment is right or wrong, depending on what the 
frame of reference is. If the frame of reference is a conservative culture, 
corporal punishment is right. If it is a liberal culture, corporal punish-
ment is wrong. Without reference to a culture, an action is neither right 
nor wrong. Moreover, whatever a culture approves of is right, so a cul-
ture is infallible concerning moral matters. It follows that neither con-
servatives nor liberals are incorrect regarding corporal punishment. 
There is no fact of the matter as to which culture is morally better than 
another. There are no moral truths that transcend diverse cultures.  
In contrast, moral objectivism entails that there are trans-cultural mor-
al truths. On this account, one culture is morally more correct than an-
other, if the former is closer to moral truths than the latter, and a culture 
is fallible concerning moral matters. Thus, cultural approval and moral 
truth come apart. Moral objectivism comprises the epistemological thesis 
that we can move toward moral truths, and the metaphysical thesis that 
moral properties and moral facts are parts of the physical universe. For 
example, the property of being right or wrong exists in the world, and so 
does the moral fact, for example, that it is wrong to tell a lie. The moral 
judgment that it is wrong to tell a lie is true because it corresponds to the 
moral fact that it is wrong to tell a lie, just as the factual belief that the 
Earth is round is true because it corresponds to the fact that the Earth is 
round.1 Consequently, on the moral objectivist account, there is no fun-
damental difference between moral and factual statements.  
Last of all, emotivism maintains that there is a fundamental difference 
between moral and factual statements. A moral statement is merely an 
expression of emotion whereas a factual statement is a description of the 
world. To say that corporal punishment is moral is to merely express a 
positive emotion toward the action, and to say that corporal punishment 
is immoral is merely to express a negative emotion toward the action. 
Given that an emotion is neither true nor false, a moral judgment is 
likewise neither true nor false, i.e., a moral judgment does not bear the 
property of being true or false. Consequently, neither the conservatives’ 
judgment nor the liberals’ judgment about corporal punishment is true 
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or false. In addition, according to emotivism, the world does not contain 
moral properties or moral facts. Normative properties and facts appear 
to dwell in the physical world, but on close inspection they do not.  
Thomson (2006), Pojman (2008), and Rachels and Rachels (2010) ad-
vance brilliant and insightful arguments in support of moral objectivism. 
In this paper, I will raise difficulties against them, and then construct a 
dilemma against the moral objectivist view that there are moral truths. 
This discussion is not only interesting in its own right but also has im-
portant practical implications. If cultural relativism is true and moral ob-
jectivism is false, the US and China ought not to accuse each other of vi-
olating human rights. After all, if no culture is morally better than anoth-
er, there would be no grounds for them to rebuke each other for being 
immoral. If emotivism is true and moral objectivism is false, the ultimate 
resolution of a moral dispute comes not when a moral property hidden 
in an act is disclosed to opposing cognizers but when they come to feel 
the same kind of emotion toward the act. After all, according to emoti-
vism, moral properties do not reside in the world, and emotion is all that 
there is to moral judgment. Thus, this paper has practical as well as theo-
retical import.  
 
CRITIQUES OF OBJECTIVIST ARGUMENTS 
 
1. The Argument from Moral Assessment 
Thomson claims that it “is possible to find out about some moral sen-
tences that they are true” (2006: 13). What led her to this optimistic epis-
temological thesis is the observation that we assess moral statements in 
our moral life, i.e., we attempt to figure out whether moral statements 
are true or false: “Moral Assessment Thesis: Moral Assessment is point-
less unless it is possible to find out about some moral statements that 
they are true” (Thomson, 2006: 13). Put differently, the attempt to de-
termine whether moral statements are true or false would only make 
sense if it were possible to discover some moral truths. Thus, Thomson’s 
argument for the optimistic view is that we can arrive at moral truths be-
cause we attempt to ascertain the truth-values of moral statements.  
Is Thomson’s argument convincing? In my view, from the fact that we 
assess statements, it does not follow that we can discover some truths. If 
we can discover some moral truths because we assess moral statements, 
then by the same token we should be able to discover some non-moral 
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emotive truths and gustatory truths because we attempt to assess them. 
Suppose, for example, that you and I have a dispute over whether snakes 
are creepy or cute, or whether alcohol is palatable or unpalatable. We at-
tempt to adjudicate between your judgments and my judgments. It does 
not follow, however, that it is possible to reveal the truth or falsity of the 
non-moral emotive judgment or the gustatory judgment. No matter what 
information you may adduce, I would not sway my judgments about 
snakes and alcohol. For example, even if you point out that a snake in 
front of you and me is not venomous, I would continue to believe that it 
is repulsive. Even if you point out that drinking alcohol harms my health, 
I would continue to think that it is palatable. Therefore, it is illegitimate 
to infer the attainability of some moral truths from our act of appraising 
moral statements. 
Moreover, our act of assessing moral statements can be explained by 
the alternative hypothesis that we have the desire to propagate our moral 
views to others. On this psychological account, we attempt to ascertain 
the truth-values of moral statements not because we can determine 
whether they are true or false but because we want to convince others of 
our moral views. For example, Korean liberals provide reasons for think-
ing that corporal punishment is wrong because they want Korean con-
servatives to hold the same moral view as they do. The same kind of ex-
planation can be given regarding the Korean conservatives’ attempt to 
justify their moral view. Thus, this psychological hypothesis competes 
with Thomson’s optimistic view concerning our act of assessing moral 
statements.  
How should we adjudicate between the two hypotheses? The psycho-
logical hypothesis is simpler than the optimistic view because the former 
explains the act of assessing moral statements without postulating the ex-
istence of metaphysically dubious items, viz., moral truths, properties, 
and facts. This case is analogous to the case of near death experience 
(NDE). NDE is an experience that people have when they almost die. 
Surprisingly, after coming back to life, they tell a similar story: They went 
through a long tunnel, encountered a bright light at the end of it, experi-
enced a feeling of euphoria, and saw the faces of their family and friends 
who had previously died. Some claim that NDE is evidence for the ex-
istence of the world of the dead. Their hypothesis, however, is undercut 
by a simpler hypothesis that when people experience NDE, an extraor-
dinary amount of endorphins is released in their brains. This alternative 
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hypothesis explains NDE, thereby obviating the need to postulate a met-
aphysically suspicious item, viz., the world of the dead. We now have no 
reason to believe that the world of the dead is real. Similarly, we have no 
reason for thinking that there are moral truths, properties, and facts, be-
cause the psychological hypothesis eliminates the need to posit the met-
aphysically questionable moral items.  
The preceding psychological hypothesis can explain away our ascrip-
tion of descriptive predicates, such as true and false, to moral statements. 
We talk as if moral statements have truth-values. For examples, we say 
that it is true that corporal punishment is immoral, instead of just saying 
that corporal punishment is immoral. On the psychological account, we 
utter such locutions because we wish to persuade others of our moral 
views. The word true is a rhetorical device to convince others of our 
moral views. We use the predicate to embellish our moral views so that 
they appear to be objective and descriptive. If a statement is true, we 
should accept it whether we like it or not. By saying that a moral state-
ment is true, we are implicitly sending a message to others that our moral 
view is objective and descriptive, and hence it is over and beyond our 
personal feeling. In short, it is otiose to postulate the existence of moral 
truths to explain our ascription of descriptive predicates to moral state-
ments. 
So far, I criticized Thomson’s argument for moral objectivism. Note 
that in doing so, I did not appeal to emotivism. Let me now explore how 
an emotivist would react to Thomson’s argument. According to the 
emotivist, we do not attempt to find out whether moral statements are 
true or false in the first place, for they are neither true nor false. A moral 
statement is incapable of being true or false because it is merely an ex-
pression of emotion, and an emotion is not a kind of a mental property 
that can be true or false. Therefore, on the emotivist account, the phe-
nomenon which Thomson attempted to explain with moral objectivism 
does not exist in the first place. Moral objectivism is a pointless hypothe-
sis, as far as emotivists are concerned.  
Then, what are we doing when we are engaged in argumentation over 
a moral issue? On the emotivist account, we are not trying to decide 
whether a moral statement is true or false but trying to get others to feel 
the same kind of emotion as we do concerning a moral issue. For exam-
ple, conservatives claim that corporal punishment serves an educational 
purpose. Liberals retort that corporal punishment violates the students’ 
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human rights. What they are doing is to attempt to have their opponents 
feel the same as they do concerning corporal punishment. They are not 
in the business of unveiling a moral property hidden in the act of cor-
poral punishment. Thus, emotivism has the theoretical resources to ac-
count for moral argumentation. 
 
2. The Argument from Truth in Scientific Matters 
The liberal culture in Korea disapproves of corporal punishment, while 
the conservative culture in Korea approves of corporal punishment. Is 
the liberal culture closer to the moral truth than the conservative culture 
in regard to corporal punishment? A cultural relativist would say no, 
maintaining that no culture is morally superior to another. Pojman, how-
ever, argues that we may be justified in believing that our moral beliefs 
are closer to truths than those of other cultures: 
 
We may not be able to know with certainty that our moral beliefs are closer to the 
truth than those of another culture or those of others within our own culture, but 
we may be justified in believing that they are. (Pojman, 2008: 21) 
 
Note that Pojman is committed to the existence of moral truths, and that 
his position is incompatible with the cultural relativist’s view that no cul-
ture is closer to moral truths than another. He supports his position with 
the following argument:  
 
If we can be closer to the truth regarding factual or scientific matters, why can’t we 
be closer to the truth on moral matters? Why can’t a culture be simply confused or 
wrong about its moral perceptions? Why can’t we say that the society like the Ik 
which sees nothing wrong with enjoying watching its own children fall into fires is 
less moral in that regard than the culture that cherishes children and grants them 
protection and equal rights? (Pojman, 2008: 21) 
 
Pojman’s argument is that one culture can be closer to the truths than 
another in moral matters because the former can be closer to truths than 
another in scientific matters. We believe, for example, that the Earth is 
round. Regarding the shape of the Earth, our culture is closer to the sci-
entific truth than another whose members believe that the Earth is flat. 
Similarly, we denounce child abuse as being morally deplorable. Regard-
ing the moral matter, our culture is closer to the moral truth than anoth-
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er whose members believe that child abuse is morally praiseworthy. Thus, 
we can make progress toward moral truths. 
Let me demonstrate that Pojman’s conclusion does not follow from 
his premise by using the aforementioned counterexamples of non-moral 
emotive and gustatory judgments. Some people feel that snakes are 
creepy, whereas other people feel that snakes are cute. The former and 
the latter may form different cultures, making opposing emotive judg-
ments about snakes. In such a situation, if Pojman is right, one of the 
two cultures will be closer to the truth than the other concerning snakes, 
the reason being that one culture can be closer to truths than another 
concerning scientific matters. Pojman’s conclusion would be problematic 
in this case, and this shows that closeness to scientific truths does not 
necessitate the closeness to non-moral emotive truths. To take another 
example, some people believe that alcohol is palatable, whereas other 
people think that alcohol is unpalatable. They form different cultures, the 
former enjoying alcohol and the latter avoiding alcohol. In such a situa-
tion, if Pojman is right, one of the two cultures would be closer to the 
truth than the other regarding alcohol because one culture can be closer 
to truths than another regarding scientific matters. However, closeness 
to scientific truths does not guarantee closeness to gustatory truths. In 
short, it is one thing that one culture can be closer to truths than another 
concerning scientific matters. It is quite another that one culture can be 
closer to truths than another concerning non-moral emotive and gusta-
tory matters. Therefore, these counterexamples show that Pojman’s ar-
gument is invalid.  
In response, Pojman may reply that there are non-moral emotive and 
gustatory truths. On this account, a non-moral emotive judgment has 
both a descriptive content and an emotive content. Thus, the statement 
that snakes are creepy expresses a belief as well as an emotion toward 
snakes. The gustatory judgment that alcohol is palatable has both a cog-
nitive content as well as a gustatory content. Consequently, the statement 
“Snakes are creepy” is more than an expression of emotion, and the 
statement “Alcohol is palatable” is more than an expression of taste. 
This view of non-moral and gustatory statements is available to Pojman, 
given that it is controversial in meta-ethics whether a moral statement 
has merely an emotive content, or has a descriptive content as well as an 
emotive content. A cognitivist could argue that like a moral statement, 
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both non-moral emotive and gustatory statements have descriptive con-
tents.  
We might grant for the sake of argument here that non-moral and gus-
tatory statements have truth-values. However, an epistemological prob-
lem arises. How can we know that one culture is closer to non-moral and 
gustatory truths than another? Recall that some people feel that snakes 
are creepy and that other people feel that snakes are cute. It is not clear 
how one party can go about convincing the other party of their view 
about snakes. No matter what information one party may present to the 
other party, the latter will not change their preexisting attitude toward 
snakes, and vice versa. In addition, it is not clear how alcohol-lovers 
would go about proving to alcohol-avoiders that alcohol is indeed palat-
able. No matter what information alcohol-lovers offer to alcohol-
avoiders, alcohol-avoiders would still think that alcohol tastes bitter. 
Moreover, no matter what information alcohol-avoiders convey to alco-
hol-lovers, alcohol-lovers would continue to believe that alcohol tastes 
sweet. In such a situation, there seems to be no way to prove that one 
party is closer to the truth than the other party concerning snakes or al-
cohol. 
What would an emotivist say about Pojman’s argument for moral ob-
jectivism? For the emotivist, a moral utterance is merely an expression of 
emotion. To say that a culture approves of an act is to say that the mem-
bers of the culture commend the act, i.e., cultural approval is reducible to 
the positive emotion of the members of the culture. To say that a culture 
disapproves of an act is to say that the members of the culture deplore 
the act, i.e., cultural disapproval is reducible to the negative emotion of 
the members of the culture. Given that an emotion is incapable of being 
true or false, cultural approval or disapproval is incapable of being true 
or false too. Since cultural approval or disapproval is neither true nor 
false, one culture can never be closer to moral truths than another. 
Another route to diffuse Pojman’s argument for moral objectivism is 
to defend cultural relativism. If no culture is morally better than another 
as cultural relativism claims, we can never be justified in believing that 
one culture is closer to moral truths than another, contrary to what 
Pojman claims. There is, however, a problem with this cultural relativist 
response to Pojman because Pojman (2008) raises many incisive criti-
cisms against cultural relativism. For example, he argues that cultural rel-
ativism has an absurd consequence that even a heinous crime can be 
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made moral by conjuring a culture which approves of it. I cannot address 
those criticisms in this paper. I only refer readers to Park (2011) for a de-
fense of cultural relativism from the acute critiques of Pojman and others. 
 
3. The Argument from Moral Justification  
Let me now turn to Rachels and Rachels’s argument for moral objectiv-
ism. Before defending moral objectivism, they accuse emotivism of over-
looking the fact that a moral judgment can be justified: 
 
If someone says, “I like peaches,” she does not need to have a reason; she may be 
making a statement about her personal taste and nothing more. But moral judg-
ments are different. If someone tells you that a particular act would be wrong, you 
may ask why, and if there is no satisfactory answer, then you may reject that advice 
as unfounded. A moral judgment – or for that matter, any kind of value judgment – 
must be supported by good reasons. Any adequate theory of ethics should be able 
to explain how reason can support moral judgments. (Rachels and Rachels, 2010: 
39-40) 
 
After rejecting emotivism, they propose that a moral statement is true if 
and only if it is supported by better reasons than its alternatives: “Moral 
truths are truths of reason; that is, a moral judgment is true if it is backed 
up by better reasons than the alternatives” (Rachels and Rachels, 2010: 41). 
Rachels and Rachels’s favorite example is lying. We can provide better 
reasons for the statement that telling a lie is bad than for the statement 
that telling a lie is good. After all, a society would collapse if people forgo 
the moral rule that we ought to tell the truth: 
 
And finally, the rule requiring truthfulness is necessary for society to exist – if we 
could not assume that other people would speak truthfully, communication would 
be impossible, and if communication were impossible, society would fall apart. 
(Rachels and Rachels, 2010: 43) 
 
Thus, it is true that telling a lie is bad, and it is false that telling a lie is 
good. Rachels and Rachels’s proposal is respectable, honoring the long 
and widely held view that we can provide justifications for moral posi-
tions.  
There are a few problems with their proposal that a moral statement is 
true when it is backed up by better reasons than its alternatives. Firstly, 
on their proposal, a moral statement is true not because it corresponds 
to a moral fact but because it is supported by better reasons than its al-
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ternatives. Thus, what makes a moral judgment true is not a moral fact 
inhabiting the world but reasons we can provide for the judgment. In 
other words, a moral statement is rendered true not by a moral state of 
affairs but by our weightier reasons for it. On their account, then, even if 
a moral statement is true, it does not follow that there is a moral proper-
ty or fact in the world. Suppose, for example, that we have weightier rea-
sons for the judgment that telling a lie is wrong than for the judgment 
that telling a lie is right. Even in such a situation, we cannot conclude 
that the property of being wrong exists in the act of lying, or that the 
world contains the moral fact that telling a lie is wrong. So far as I can 
tell, Rachels and Rachels established at best that some moral statements 
are true on their definition of ‘moral truth.’ They did not establish the 
metaphysical thesis that moral properties and facts are denizens of the 
world. 
Secondly, what if there are two opposing reasons of equal weight for 
two conflicting moral views? Suppose that an abortionist and an anti-
abortionist adduce reasons to support their conflicting moral positions, 
and that their reasons are of equal weight. On Rachels and Rachels’s ac-
count, then, the statement “Abortion is right” is neither true nor false, 
and so is the statement “Abortion is wrong.” These moral statements 
would acquire truth-values when one side comes up with a new reason, 
tipping the scale in its favor. This is not, however, what we normally 
think of a factual statement. Suppose, for example, that one scientist says 
that there is life beyond the Earth, that another scientist says that there is 
no life outside of the Earth, and that they present evidence of equal 
weight. Are their statements neither true nor false? The answer is no. 
Their statements have truth-values, even if the evidence for one state-
ment and the evidence for the other statement cancel out each other. For 
a moral objectivist, there is no fundamental difference between moral 
and factual statements, so he believes that the moral statements “Abor-
tion is right” and “Abortion is wrong” are either true or false even 
though they are supported by countervailing evidence of equal weight. 
Therefore, even the moral objectivist would reject Rachels and Rachels’s 
account of moral truth. 
A reflection on the historical change of morality also delivers a strike 
against Rachels and Rachels’s account of moral truth. Suppose that in the 
past the weight of reasons for slavery was heavier than that of the rea-
sons against it. By contrast, today the weight of reasons against slavery is 
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heavier than that of the reasons for it. On Rachels and Rachels’s account, 
then, the moral statement “Slavery is right” was true in the past, but it is 
false now, i.e., its truth-value has changed from truth to falsehood. This 
is not, however, what we ordinarily think of a factual statement. Consid-
er the factual statement “The Earth is flat.” We think that it was false in 
the past, and that it is false now too. Its truth-value did not change in ac-
cordance with the change of the weight of the evidence for it or for its 
alternative. Again, for a moral objectivist, there is no fundamental differ-
ence between moral and factual statements, so he believes that the truth-
value of the moral statement ‘Slavery is wrong’ did not change as a result 
of the change of the weight of the evidence for it or for its alternative. 
Since Rachels and Rachels’s account of moral truth says otherwise, even 
the moral objectivist would reject it.  
Given that Rachels and Rachels emphasize the role of reason in ethics, 
they would argue that we can know that a moral statement is true be-
cause we can provide a justification for it. For example, we can justify 
the moral judgment that it is wrong to tell a lie. If people do not hold the 
moral judgment, communications between individuals would be impos-
sible, and the “society would fall apart” (Rachels and Rachels, 2010: 43). 
The justification exhibits the probable truth of the moral statement that 
telling a lie is wrong. Thus, we can arrive at a moral truth through the 
justification of a moral statement.  
What are we to make of the justification for the moral statement that 
telling a lie is wrong? In my view, the justification displays not that the 
statement is likely to be true but that the statement is likely to be useful. 
After all, what they are saying is that we are overall happier when we act 
in accordance with the moral judgment. If people abide by the rule 
“Don’t tell a lie,” communication would be possible, and it would con-
tribute to the prosperity of their society. The problem here is that it is 
one thing for a statement to be useful, and quite another for it to be true. 
As Goldman (Goldman, 1999: 43-44) notes, statements do not coincide 
with true statements. For example, the statement that the Earth is at the 
center of the universe was useful in the past, bringing comfort to many 
people, but it was false because there was no state of affairs in the world 
that made it true. Thus, from the fact that we provide a justification for a 
moral position, it does not follow that the moral position is revealed to 
be likely to be true. Moral truths are not required to honor the role of 
reason in ethics, contrary to what Rachels and Rachels contend.  
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THE DILEMMA OF MORAL PERCEPTION 
 
I now advance an argument against the moral objectivist view that a 
moral judgment has cognitive content. Notice that a dispute over de-
scriptive properties, such as shape, size, mass, and motion, can be easily 
resolved with the use of our perceptive faculties. For example, you be-
lieve that a cat in front of us is 1kg, whereas I believe that it is 2kg. This 
kind of dispute can easily come to a settlement, as long as our perceptive 
faculties function properly. However, a moral dispute may not be settled, 
even if our perceptive faculties work well. Recall that Korean liberals and 
conservatives have different moral attitudes toward corporal punishment 
in schools. Both liberals and conservatives can see corporal punishment 
with their own eyes, and their perceptive faculties work flawlessly. Yet, 
they do not reach an agreement, and thus their dispute lingers.  
By using the preceding example, let me construct what I call the di-
lemma of moral perception against moral objectivism. Moral objectivism 
asserts that either the property of being right or the property of being 
wrong inheres in corporal punishment. In case the property of being 
right exists, conservatives can be said to have perceived what liberals do 
not. In this case, the property of wrong exists, and liberals can be said to 
have observed what conservative do not. The problem with either case is 
that it is mysterious why one party sees what the other party does not 
when their perceptive faculties are all working normally.  
The dilemma of moral perception can be strengthened by the consid-
eration that corporal punishment is a macrophysical action, which can be 
observed with our naked eyes. It is not a microphysical action like an 
electron’s orbiting the nucleus of an atom. Furthermore, corporal pun-
ishment is an action occurring in a place physically close to us. It is not 
an action happening in a distant region of space like a black hole’s en-
gulfing of a celestial body. Moreover, corporal punishment is a current 
practice. It is not a past event like a meteorite’s killing dinosaurs. Conse-
quently, it seems wrong to say that we cannot perceive the property of 
being right or wrong in corporal punishment because it is too small to be 
seen, because it is physically too remote from us, or because it only exist-
ed in the distant past.  
In order to account for the moral disagreement, a moral objectivist 
may appeal to the thesis that observation is theory-laden, which I shall 
call ladenism. On the ladenist account, conservatives and liberals make 
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conflicting moral judgments when they observe the same action, cor-
poral punishment, because their observations are laden with different 
value systems. Liberals’ observation is infected with the liberal value sys-
tem, which includes the moral principle that the students’ human rights 
ought not to be violated. Conservatives’ perception is contaminated with 
the conservative value system, which includes the moral principle that 
unruly students must be disciplined. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
different people issue inconsistent moral judgments when they see the 
same action. A moral disagreement stems from different moral frame-
works, through which subjects see the world.  
It seems to me, however, that invoking ladenism backfires upon moral 
objectivism. In philosophy of science, it is the skeptic who wields laden-
ism against scientific realism. If ladenism is true in science, it is circular 
to justify a scientific theory with theory-impregnated data. Moreover, sci-
entists of opposing paradigms cannot share data, and thus observations 
cannot serve as neutral arbiters between competing theories. It follows 
that we should be skeptical that scientific theories are true. Analogously, 
if ladenism is true in ethics, observations cannot determine which of the 
rival moral judgments is true. Thus, ladenism makes observations epis-
temically impotent in ethics, thereby expelling moral truths to an epis-
temically remote realm, to the despair of the moral objectivist.  
Moreover, ladenism is a problematic hypothesis. As Park (2009: 118) 
notes, scientists of opposing paradigms shared observational data in the 
history of science. For example, Kepler, a Copernican scientist, bor-
rowed observational data from Tycho, a Ptolemaic scientist, in order to 
improve the Copernican theory. Einstein used Michelson-Morley’s ex-
perimental result to devise the special theory of relativity. Setting these 
historical examples aside, it sounds implausible to argue that conserva-
tives and liberals do not share observational data due to theory-ladenness 
of observation. After all, they can agree that a 50cm long rod was in a 
teacher’s hand, that it moved at 50km/h, and that it reached a student’s 
shoulder. Since ladenism is problematic, it is of no use for a moral objec-
tivist to invoke it to account for moral disagreement. 
Unlike a moral objectivist, an emotivist has a neat explanation of in-
tractable moral disagreements. On the emotivist account, it is difficult to 
resolve the dispute between conservatives and liberals in Korea, not be-
cause it is difficult to perceive the property of being right or wrong in 
corporal punishment, but because the opposing parties merely have dif-
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ferent emotions toward corporal punishment, and because their emo-
tions are so entrenched in their minds that they are immune to the influx 
of information from the world and to persuasion of others. Entrenched 
emotions are found not only in moral matters but also in non-moral 
emotive matters and gustatory matters. Suppose that snakes are creepy, 
and that alcohol tastes good to Jill, a pregnant woman. Her feeling to-
ward snakes and her taste for alcohol are so deeply ingrained in her mind 
that they cannot be dislodged no matter what new factual information 
about snakes and alcohol flows into her mind. Even if she is informed 
that a snake is not poisonous, it may still be repulsive to her. Even if she 
newly learns that alcohol causes a deformity to her embryo, it may still 
taste good to her. Thus, some moral disagreements are not amenable to 
resolution not because moral properties are undetectable but because 
opposing parties have opposing entrenched emotions. 
A caveat is in order here. I am not saying that all emotions are en-
trenched in our minds. Obviously, factual information can easily remove 
some emotions from our minds in certain cases. For instance, I may feel 
anger toward my friend because I misunderstood his intention. If new 
factual information about his intention flows into my mind, my anger 
may subside. My anger toward my friend was not entrenched. Thus, in-
formation from the world cannot solve a moral dispute only when an en-
trenched emotion, not just any emotion, is involved in a moral judgment.  
Critics may retort that many serious objections have been raised 
against emotivism in the meta-ethics literature. Contra an emotivist, for 
example, some meta-ethicists argue that a moral judgment has cognitive 
as well as emotive content, so that both a belief and an emotion are con-
stitutive of a moral judgment. My reply to this objection is that if a moral 
statement is true or false as moral objectivism asserts, we are plunged in-
to the unsavory position that conservatives see a property which liberals 
do not see, or vice versa, when their perceptive faculties are not dysfunc-
tioning and the property is observable. Put differently, a moral objectivist 
faces the dilemma of moral perception, as sketched above. How about 
other criticisms leveled against emotivism in the literature? For example, 
there are disagreements in our moral life, but if emotivism is true, there 
is no moral disagreement because opposing parties merely cheer against 
each other like opposing fans at a sports event. I cannot address such 
objections due to lack of space. A full-fledged defense of emotivism is 
postponed for a separate occasion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The arguments of Thomson, Pojman, and Rachels and Rachels have 
failed to establish the optimistic view that we can move toward moral 
truths. From the fact that we assess moral statements, it does not follow 
that we can discover some moral truths. Truths are not needed to ex-
plain our act of evaluating moral statements. From the fact that one cul-
ture can be closer to truths than another in scientific matters, it does not 
follow that one culture can be closer to truths than another in moral 
matters. Progress is not necessarily carried over from science to morality. 
The fact that a moral statement is justified shows not that it is likely to 
be true but that it is likely to be useful. Finally, the dilemma of moral 
perception spells trouble for the moral objectivist view that there are 
moral truths, and that we can move toward them. 
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Notes 
 
1 I operate under the correspondence theory of truth in this paper because I believe 
along with Goldman (1999, Chapter 2) that it is the best theory of truth. Any at-
tempt to establish moral truths under other theories of truth, such as thecoherence 
theory, the deflationary theory, and the pragmatic theory, falls outside the range of 
this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
